In recognition of Seward's Day this month, we're posting the following column by Tom Kizzia that was first
published in the Anchorage Daily News and is reprinted here with the author’s
permission. Kizzia’s book “Pilgrim's Wilderness” will be published later this
year.
In the years just after the American Civil
War, were bribes paid to win congressional approval for the purchase of Alaska?
And did the American politician credited by history with making the deal know
about the payments?
The answer to both questions is almost
certainly yes, according to a major new biography of William H. Seward.
The first juicy political corruption scandal
in Alaska's history has been disinterred by biographer Walter Stahr. The author
bases his claim on two pieces of strong evidence—private jottings by two
political associates of Seward, each saying he'd been told about the bribes by
the Secretary of State himself.
The $7.2 million purchase price for Russian
America, so familiar to Alaska school kids, apparently included $7 million for
the czar and $200,000 for the Russian ambassador to cover miscellaneous
"expenses" associated with the sale.
The man behind the deal was one of the
leading American politicians of his era. Through the war years, Seward was
Abraham Lincoln's closest cabinet adviser. His memory has been enshrined here
in the name of a town, a major highway, and a day off for state workers.
Lately, Seward has also returned to national
attention, thanks to the Civil War's sesquicentennial and a bestselling book by
Doris Kearns Goodwin about Lincoln's management style, "Team of
Rivals." In the new Steven Spielberg movie, "Lincoln," Seward is
one of the principal characters, played by the actor David Strathairn.
But lurking in the shadows of Seward's
reputation has long been the question of whether the signature accomplishment
of his career, the Alaska purchase, was achieved through less-than-noble means.
Questions about the money were raised even at
the time of the territorial deal. A congressional investigation concluded in
1869 that money had passed secretly from Russian ambassador Edouard de Stoeckl—known
around Washington as "the Baron," though he held no such formal title—to
a trio of powerful lobbyists. The lobbyists paid off journalists for favorable
coverage, the investigating committee was told.
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Edouard de Stoeckl |
Did they pay off members of Congress as well?
Allegations to that effect were rampant, but the investigating committee
sidestepped these claims as "nebulous gossip."
It turned out, however, that Seward spoke
openly of such payments at least twice, telling his boss, President Andrew
Johnson, that the bribes had been as high as $10,000.
That was a lot of money back then, especially
measured against the change pocketed by Alaska legislators in the recent Veco
political scandal.
Seward's private comments were never reported
to investigators. Later, historians did uncover the private journals, but for
whatever reason did not give them much credit. In time, questions about
Alaska's corrupt legacy were laid quietly to rest.
Until now.
Stahr's genteel and readable 547-page
biography, "Seward: Lincoln's Indispensable Man," is a generally
admiring portrait, which perhaps adds credibility to his head-shaking
conclusion that Seward perjured himself before Congress when he testified he
knew nothing about Alaska payoffs.
"Seward knew that . . . his opponents
would use every weapon available in order to defeat Johnson and the Alaska
purchase," Stahr writes. "In short, Seward was not a saint, he was a
practical politician, and he was prepared if necessary to use dubious means to
achieve great goals.
CHANGE OF HEART BY TWO KEY CHAIRMEN
The son of a small-town northern
slave-holding family, a U.S. senator and former progressive governor of New
York, Seward became a leading anti-slavery Republican in the years before the
war. He was the favorite to win the party's presidential nomination in 1860,
only to be upset at the convention by a small-town lawyer from Illinois. Seward
joined his rival's cabinet and to some observers became, as Stahr puts it,
"the real power in the administration"—if not its moral force, then
its cagey political veteran. He was particularly credited with the tricky
maneuvering necessary to keep England and France from entering the war on the
side of the Confederacy.
Lincoln and Seward became close confidantes
and friends. On the night Lincoln was assassinated, Seward was wounded by a
knife-wielding conspirator. Seward recovered, and stayed on with Vice President
Johnson as a steadying influence through the volatile period of Reconstruction
politics and impeachment that followed.
Seward negotiated the treaty for Russia's
colony in 1867. It was part of the secretary's expansionist ambition for the
United States, according to Stahr, one that also coveted Panama, islands in the
Pacific and the Carribean, and even Greenland and British Columbia. Alaska was
seen as important, not only for its resources, but as a forward naval and
steamship refueling base on the "great circle" trading route to Asia,
a point expanded on in Stephen Haycox's book "Alaska: An American
Colony."
The Alaska purchase idea was popular in its
day, historians say, despite being mocked by a few as "Seward's
Folly." But the atmosphere in Washington at the time was poisonous:
President Johnson was in the midst of being impeached by the House of
Representatives for resisting the so-called Radical Republicans over handling
of the post-war South.
The Alaska treaty was signed in secret on
March 30, 1867—the occasion now celebrated as Seward's Day—but the purchase
money could not be wrestled out of Congress until July 1868. The final debate
and vote, on a summer day when the temperature in pre-air-conditioned
Washington was above 100 degrees, inspired many predictable jokes.
For a year, the main obstacle to the
appropriation had not been Johnson's impeachment or concern about American
imperialism but an objection from a well-connected Massachusetts family named
Perkins, who said the Russians owed them money from an arms deal during the
Crimean War. They wanted part of the purchase price set aside for their claim.
Stahr's new book points at two key committee
chairman, early supporters of the Perkins claim, who reversed themselves to
support the Alaska appropriation with no strings attached: Rep. Nathaniel
Banks, head of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Rep. Thaddeus Stevens,
head of the powerful Ways and Means Committee.
Responding to newspaper reports and rumors at
the time, the 1869 congressional inquiry focused its attention on secret
payments to lobbyists and journalists. An investigative reporter for the New
York Sun named Uriah Painter found the tables turned when one of the exposed
lobbyists, a former senator from Mississippi, told Congress that Painter had
written his exposes only after asking for a bribe and being turned down.
Painter, who may have tried leading on the lobbyists to test his suspicions,
denied the charge as a low tactic. The resulting kerfuffle proved highly
entertaining to official Washington, while distracting attention from any evidence
of wrongdoing by members of Congress themselves.
"TARNISHED LOBBYISTS"
What about that evidence? Stahr quotes from
notes kept by President Johnson of a September 6, 1868 conversation with
Seward, in which he was told that the bill succeeded thanks to payments made
through Stoeckl, the Russian ambassador. Seward told him the money went to
lobbyist Robert J. Walker, a friend of Seward's, and to the editor of a
powerful Washington newspaper, but also to Banks and the "incorruptible
Thaddeus Stevens."
Seward revealed something similar to his old
friend John Bigelow two weeks later, which Bigelow recorded in his private
diary. This time Seward also referred to ten unnamed congressmen.
Meanwhile Stoeckl was writing confidentially
to Russia, Stahr says, asserting that Seward was working with Walker to employ
"all sorts of means" to win support, all the while working "with
the greatest circumspection."
By the time he gets to his account of Alaska,
Stahr has already recounted Seward's role in raising funds, dangling patronage
jobs and working with "tarnished lobbyists" to secure passage of the
13th Amendment, banning slavery under the Constitution, and to prevent
conviction of the president on trumped-up impeachment charges. As in the Alaska
case, these forays into the dark political arts were in pursuit of higher
political goals, never personal enrichment, according to Stahr.
"NOT GUILTY, OR AT LEAST NOT
PROVEN"
Congressional investigators may have never
heard what Seward admitted privately, but later historians did. Haycox, in his
2002 Alaska history, notes the bribery rumors but concludes Seward did nothing
more than wine and dine his colleagues. Haycox largely based his conclusion on
a short 1983 book by historian Paul S. Holbo that examined the scandal in
detail.
In "Tarnished Expansion," Holbo
quoted the Johnson and Bigelow diaries, but then dismissed them as unreliable.
Johnson, known as a tippler, might have been drunk at the time, and the names
and dollar figures in the two accounts were inconsistent, Holbo wrote.
The historian cited biographers of Stevens,
who doubted the ailing firebrand would have taken a bribe in the last year of
his life, despite his need for money. The case against Banks was stronger,
Holbo conceded, but also circumstantial. Having found no evidence of money
problems or sudden wealth in Banks' letters and family records, Holbo concluded
the verdict on Banks should be "not guilty, or at least not proven."
He surmised that Stoeckl may have kept the "lion's share" of expense
money for himself.
Unfortunately, Stahr doesn't delve into this
historical dispute, or take a prosecutorial run at the defense evidence. So the
case must remain open. The private records of Johnson and Bigelow, consistent
in important ways, are treated by Stahr as evidence lying in plain sight. A
lawyer himself, he couches his accusation carefully before moving on with his
story: "If we believe Bigelow and Johnson, Seward's testimony was
perjury."
The one other person who could have shed
light on these matters at the time was the Russian ambassador, Stoeckl.
Unfortunately, he was not available to congressional investigators. Two months
after the appropriation was approved, the Baron left Washington for Europe on a
vacation, and once there announced his retirement, never to return to the
United States.